University of Massachusetts Amherst

ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
History Open Access Publications

History

2018

Rousseau and the Paradox of the Nation-State
Timothy Lang
University of Massachusetts Amherst, langt@history.umass.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/history_oapubs
Part of the European History Commons
Recommended Citation
Lang, Timothy, "Rousseau and the Paradox of the Nation-State" (2018). History Open Access Publications. 2.
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/history_oapubs/2

This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the History at ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in History
Open Access Publications by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@library.umass.edu.

Rousseau and the Paradox of the Nation-State

But what are nations? What are these groups which are so
familiar to us, and yet, if we stop to think, so strange…?
Walter Bagehot, Physics and Politics (1872)

The nation-state, especially as it took shape in Europe during the
nineteenth century, was perhaps the most paradoxical political institution of its age. Its impact on the modern world has been tremendous.
Nation-states are basic constituents of modernity, providing the framework in which most of us lead our lives, and nationality is one of the
fundamental conditions shaping our personal identity. We live in a system of territorial nation-states and see ourselves as belonging to one or
more of them.1 And yet, how problematic the institution seems when
expectations are weighed against outcomes.
Nineteenth-century liberals endorsed the nation-state as a means to
progress. It would promote peace and stability, they said, by bringing
political and national boundaries into alignment. It would set the
groundwork for prosperity by transforming small states into large markets and for popular government by establishing liberal institutions responsive to the national will. The nation-state would encourage the
liberty of individuals and peoples, the free development of the human
spirit through meaningful communion with like-minded citizens. In
some places and at some times it did all of these. Walter Bagehot saw
nation-building as a necessary step toward progress; John Stuart Mill
suggested that nation-states were a precondition for democracy; Johann
Gottlieb Fichte taught that only by living in a nation could an individ1
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ual gain access to the “eternal and the divine.” But no one was as optimistic as Giuseppe Mazzini, for whom nations were God’s chosen way
for men and women to work for the well-being of all humanity. Someday, he prophesied, Europe would conform to God’s plan: nations and
states would become coterminous and then “harmony and fraternity”
would prevail. 2
And yet, the nation-state was an institution born of conflict. The
wars of Italian and German unification, which disturbed the long nineteenth-century peace, and the Balkan wars of the early twentieth century, which led to the horrors of World War I, make this abundantly clear.
Despite what its champions might have thought, the nation-state was
an abstraction confronting an intransigent reality. It could never have
coalesced in its pure form because nationalities with unambiguous identities and borders simply did not exist in Europe, and attempts to create
it encountered insurmountable obstacles. Under these conditions, nationalism became strident and exclusive. Its politics became authoritarian, as aspiring nation-states discriminated against minorities, waged
war on their neighbors, and demanded sacrifices from their citizens that
might reasonably be construed as antithetical to freedom. An institution that many liberals hoped would bring peace, prosperity and freedom to Europe had just as often yielded contrary results.
This essay contends that a reading of Rousseau’s Social Contract, set
against the eighteenth-century state system, reveals one way in which
political thinking at the end of the Enlightenment anticipated this
paradox. Neither nationalism nor the nation-state were fully developed
concepts at the time Rousseau was writing, though glimpses of them
appear in his works, suggesting in hindsight just how problematic the
emerging nation-state might be. Rousseau’s Social Contract is a complex
work of political philosophy, and no one who has read it carefully can
deny that it contains any number of ambiguities. Its purpose was to
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delineate the perfect republic, to indicate how people should organize
themselves politically to bring about the maximum degree of human
freedom. But the matter was not that simple. Rousseau did not confine
his republic to an idealized setting. He placed it within an international
order, one state among many, and knew that it would need to defend
itself. He may have designed the republic for liberty and self-government, but he equipped it for war. In the process, he endorsed a model
of human association that, while possibly suitable for defense, insisted
on uniformity and was not afraid to use coercion in order to achieve it.
Rousseau’s Social Contract was a work of philosophy discussing ideas,
not lived experience. But to the extent that ideas reflect behavior, it
provides insights into why the emerging nation-state was often accompanied by war, an emphasis on social conformity, and a tendency toward authoritarian politics.

1
Rousseau—if we believe his Confessions—began thinking about
political institutions in 1743 or 1744, while serving in Venice as private
secretary to the French ambassador. 3 He worked hard at his job and
studied the art of diplomacy, a profession he hoped to make his own.
This preoccupation with foreign aﬀairs suggests that war and international relations were never far from his mind as he began the train
of thought that would lead eventually to the Social Contract of 1762.
He began these speculations during the War of the Austrian Succession
and finished them as the Seven Years War was coming to an end. To
read Rousseau’s political thought, then, against the eighteenth-century
state system is not out of place. For in the Social Contract, Rousseau
described the self-governing association, or republic, and asked how it
might survive in a world of predatory states. An answer to that very
practical question formed part of the book’s original design.
3
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This question was not new. Republican theorists, from the early
Renaissance onward, had pondered the rise and fall of republics, paying
particular attention to how the republic should defend itself in a hostile
international system. Florentine civic humanism had made the republic’s survival depend on the ability of its citizens to fulfill their responsibilities and bear arms in its defense. Fifteenth-century Italy was a land
of independent regional states, all potentially in competition with one
another. By the end of the century, Europe’s great territorial monarchies
had started to intervene on the peninsula as well. The struggle between
Milan and Florence was paramount at the beginning of the fifteenth
century; the involvement of France, Spain and the Empire in Italian
aﬀairs was crucial at its end. Confronted by rivals, the Florentines articulated a civic humanism that called on citizens to lead virtuous public
lives, to meet their civic responsibilities, to sacrifice private ambition for
the common good, and to bear arms in defense of the republic. Machiavelli in particular understood the problem as a contest between virtù
and fortuna, between the spirit of the republic’s citizens and the blind
forces of chance. Service in the militia became for Machiavelli the highest expression of republican virtue, as the citizen-soldier renounced private interests in order to defend the republic and impose order on recalcitrant fortune.4
Rousseau’s Europe was as subject to fortune as Machiavelli’s Italy.
The state system as it developed from the War of the Austrian Succession to the Seven Years War was essentially anarchic. There were no institutions capable of enforcing a lawful international order: the Empire
and Papacy had lost whatever influence they might have once possessed,
while the concert of Europe had not yet come into being. Contemporaries might have thought a balance of power regulated the system just
as naturally as the law of supply and demand regulated the marketplace.
But the balance of power, as the eighteenth century understood it, did
not guarantee peace. War played an integral part in maintaining the
4
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balance because states had to make good on the threat of war in order
to prevent hegemony. In practice, the period saw conflict as dynastic
states competed for advantage and as statesmen employed war as normal policy, seeking to expand and acquire territory in compensation for
gains made by rival states. 5 Bellicose as it was, this reality would enable
Rousseau to argue, without fear of contradiction, that the social state, as
opposed to the state of nature, was distinguished by war.
Dynastic ambition characterized the War of the Austrian Succession (1740–1748) from beginning to end. Frederick the Great desired
to enhance Prussia’s power and prestige by seizing Silesia. Charles Albert
of Bavaria hoped to capture Bohemia and the title of Holy Roman Emperor. Maria Theresa needed to defend her territorial inheritance and
claim the imperial title for her husband, Francis Stephen of Lorraine.
The Spanish monarchs, Philip V and Elizabeth Farnese, sought a suitable principality in Italy for Elizabeth’s youngest son, while Charles
Emmanuel III desired to expand Piedmont-Sardinia’s power in Italy at
the expense of Spain and Austria. These were the rivalries and ambitions
plaguing Europe as Rousseau arrived in Venice in 1743.6 Behind them
lurked the great struggle between Habsburg and Bourbon for dominance in Europe, and between England and France for control of the
seas. When Rousseau complained that kings had only two functions,
“extending their domination abroad and rendering it more absolute at
home,” he knew what he was talking about.7
These rivalries persisted into the next decade, laying the groundwork for the Seven Years War (1756–1763). Anglo-French competition
led to war in the colonies, especially North America, while AustroPrussian enmity—Frederick’s desire to hold on to Silesia, Maria Theresa’s determination to win it back—brought war to the continent. The
intervention of Russia and the failure of the European states to defeat
Prussia led to the consolidation of the great power system in which
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Britain, France, Austria, Russia and Prussia dominated continental affairs while the lesser powers played a subservient role.8 No wonder, then, that Rousseau, who wrote the Socia
that Rousseau, who wrote the Social Contract just as this system was
coming into existence, asked of the ideal republic, “but if it is very
small, will it be subjugated?” 9 The question of the republic’s survival in
an international order dominated by hostile powers was not simply one
he inherited from the classic age of Florentine republican thinking; it
was equally the question posed by the age of Frederick the Great.
Rousseau analyzed the European state system in a number of works
that he wrote between 1743, when he arrived in Venice, and 1762,
when he published the Social Contract.10 Some, like the Discourse on the
Origins of Inequality and the article on “Political Economy” that he
wrote for Diderot’s Encyclopedia, touched on the subject tangentially.
Others, like his synopsis and criticism of Abbé de St Pierre’s Plan for
Perpetual Peace, dealt with it directly, but are usually considered minor
works. A number of fragments on war and peace make up yet a third
category. All of these writings date to the years between 1754 and 1756,
just before the Seven Years War, and all regard warfare as the natural
condition of civilization, the inevitable consequence of man’s departure
from the state of nature and his entrance into civil society. War, for
Rousseau, was endemic to the eighteenth century and a structural component of its state system.
In the Discourse on the Origins of Inequality, Rousseau made his
case. Men and women in the state of nature were as a rule peaceful because a profound sympathy for all living creatures—what he called
“pity”—tempered their propensity for self-preservation. The selfish passions that so often provoked conflict, he argued, famously controverting
Hobbes, were simply not found there.11 But no matter how idyllic this
natural state may have been, the human capacity for perfection eventually induced men and women to leave it behind and gather in society.

6
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This transition was crucial for Rousseau’s thinking about war. Now that
a social state had coalesced in which individuals judged themselves
against others, those Hobbesian passions emerged. Pride in particular
turned voluntary wrongs into outrages which the injured party had to
avenge in deeds that were as cruel and bloodthirsty as the outrage was
humiliating. Property similarly divided people, unleashing ambition
and driving them to compete with each other to see who could accumulate the most, not out of need, but simply out of a desire to raise
themselves above others. 12 Pride and property: here were two conditions that made war integral to human society as Rousseau understood
it in the eighteenth century, when princes fought over parcels of territory in order to assuage slights to their prestige. “Nascent Society,” he
concluded, “gave way to the most horrible state of war….” 13
This progression to the social state was soon replicated everywhere.
Men and women formed associations for self-preservation and the protection of property. They renounced their natural freedom, departed
from the state of nature, and subjected themselves to the laws of civil
society. One such association inevitably gave rise to others, ensuring
that the earth became populated with competing nations. With only
“tacit conventions” to regulate their conduct—what Rousseau called the
right of nations—they engaged in mutual slaughter. “Hence arose National Wars, Battles, murders, and reprisals which make Nature tremble
and shock reason…,” Rousseau wrote in a passage conveying his disgust
at what civilization often entailed. “The most decent men learned to
consider it one of their duties to murder their fellows; at length men
were seen to massacre each other by the thousands without knowing
why; more murders were committed on a single day of fighting and
more horrors in the capture of a single city than were committed in the
state of Nature during whole centuries over the entire face of the
earth.”14
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The character of the state, Rousseau continued, now approaching
the subject from a diﬀerent angle, also contributed to this condition of
chronic warfare. In his article on “Political Economy,” he assigned the
state a will, which he defined as an expression of sovereignty. In a republic, where the people were sovereign, the will was general. In a
monarchy, where a prince was sovereign, the will was personal. In either
case, the state was an active agent, exerting itself in the world, seeking
to fulfill either the general will of the people or the personal will of the
prince. 15 Eighteenth-century Europe, where all the emerging great powers were monarchies, was thus a system of willing, active states, all in
competition with each other, as their sovereign princes sought to protect their prestige and augment their territory. What is more, the state
was an artificial body without natural limits. Its potential for expansion
was practically endless. Rousseau pointed out in one of his fragments
on war that states constantly tried to overcome their vulnerabilities by
expanding at the expense of their neighbors. Any state system, he concluded, was therefore inherently unstable: as member states sought security through expansion, they inevitably threatened their neighbors,
prompting retaliatory expansion in return.16
Rousseau’s conception of the prince as a willful actor on the international stage informed his criticism of the Abbé de St Pierre’s plan
for perpetual peace. The Abbé de St Pierre had suggested that Europe
existed in a balance of power, a natural equilibrium that included a
chronic state of war as one of its elements. This balance may have been
natural and achieved without human eﬀort, but it was flawed because it
required war as the means of maintaining itself. The Abbé de St Pierre
proposed to perfect this arrangement and achieve “a perpetual and universal peace” by organizing the states of Europe into a federation based
on everything they held in common: religion, morals, customs, literature, institutions, laws, geography, commerce. The federation’s governing congress would guarantee peace by arbitrating disputes, enforcing
8
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treaties and making decisions with the authority of law and backed by
armed force.17 Rousseau’s principal objection to this plan was that Europe’s princes would never consent to it because they were too independent and irrational to be bound by anything. As willing sovereigns,
princes rarely pursued their real interests, which might be fulfilled by
peace, but rather pursued their apparent interests, which were more
often fulfilled by war. Princes would never renounce the opportunity to
extend their boundaries and increase their prestige. They would never
subordinate themselves to the decisions of a tribunal since doing so
would diminish that prestige by admitting weakness. What does a
prince who goes to war risk except the lives of his subjects, Rousseau
asked rhetorically? If he risked little, he chanced to gain much, since
princely reputations were based largely on the ability to wage war.18
The fragments on war confirm this picture. There we find
Rousseau’s well-known description of civilized Europe as a field of carnage: “I raise my eyes and look into the distance. I perceive fires and
flames, deserted countryside, pillaged cities. Fierce men, where are you
dragging those wretched people? I hear a frightful noise; what tumult!
what cries! I draw near; I see a theater of murders, ten thousand slaughtered men, the dead piled up in heaps, the dying crushed under the
hooves of horses, everywhere the image of death and agony. This, then,
is the fruit of these peaceful institutions! Pity, indignation raise themselves at the bottom of my heart. Ah barbarous philosopher! Come read
us your book on a battlefield.”19 So Rousseau rejected the Hobbesian
notion that warfare defined the state of nature. Instead, war arose later,
once men and women had entered the civil state and nations populated
the world. These nations, however, existed in a condition of anarchy
with little to restrain them: natural law, which had earlier tempered
human behavior, spoke only to individuals, not to nations; and international law was meaningless because it had no sanction. In coming
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together as nations, then, humankind created conditions that made war
all but inevitable. 20
Rousseau prefaced his Discourse on the Origins of Inequality with a
dedication to the Republic of Geneva in which he expressed his wish to
live in a country whose government was based on popular sovereignty.
But he knew that such a republic would always be precarious in a world
of predatory states. It would have to be so small, he warned, that it
would not feel the temptation to conquer and so fortunately situated as
to have friendly neighbors. 21 Only in such favorable circumstances
could a self-governing body of citizens hope to survive, and the likelihood of finding such circumstances in the Europe of Frederick the
Great was all but impossible. Like Machiavelli, then, Rousseau realized
the precariousness of the republic, and like Machiavelli, he would call
on its citizens to bear arms in its defense.

2
In the Social Contract, Rousseau presented his conception of the
ideal republic. His argument was notoriously complex—even ambiguous—and these qualities have ensured that it has given rise to any
number of competing interpretations. Without attempting to resolve
these controversies, I simply want to point out a correlation between
Rousseau’s awareness of the republic’s international precariousness and
his understanding of its essential character: for the republic was admirably suited for the task of defense. The model that Rousseau had in
mind as he wrote the Social Contract was the classic republic with its
emphasis on civic virtue. 22 No wonder: previously, in his Discourse on
the Sciences and Arts, he had revealed a strong preference for the martial
values associated with ancient republics: warlike Sparta, he proclaimed,
was a “Republic of demi-Gods rather than men, so superior did their
virtues seem to humanity.”23
10
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According to Rousseau, the republic originated in a voluntary act
of incorporation whereby a number of people freely chose to submerge
their individual wills beneath a general will. Here is how he first described the process:
If, then, we set aside from the social pact everything that is not essential to it, we will find that it can be reduced to the following
terms: Each of us puts his person and all his power in common under
the supreme direction of the general will; and as a body we receive every
member as an indivisible part of the whole. Instantly, in place of the
private person of each contracting party, this act of association creates a moral and collective body, composed of as many members as
there are voices in the assembly, which receives from this same act
its unity, its common self, its life, and its will. This public person,
formed by the union of all the other persons, formerly took the
name City, and now takes that of Republic….24
In his account of the republic’s origin, Rousseau borrowed from Roman
law the concept of incorporation, which he found in Hobbes and
which established how a number of individuals come together to form a
single public person. Rousseau then made several claims regarding this
act of incorporation. To begin with, it created an association that was
more than a simple aggregation of people held together by force. It was
an association with a common good, with a genuine source of internal
unity, with the kind of cohesion that animated a living organism. Because the republic was a single person, it had a single will, which
Rousseau called the general will.
This act of incorporation also produced an association that respected the freedom of each individual member. Since all citizens participated in the deliberations of the assembly, the general will came to represent their own best interests, and this responsiveness to the voice of
every citizen was what Rousseau meant by popular sovereignty. In order
11
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to preserve the generality of the will, the decisions of the assembly had
to be binding on all its members, regardless of whether they were of the
majority or not. Regarding those cases where private interests deviated
from the general will, Rousseau’s judgment was chilling: “whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be constrained to do so by the entire
body; which means only that he will be forced to be free….”25 Only
within an association of this sort, Rousseau continued, did people acquire a moral sensibility. As they departed the state of nature and entered the republic’s civil society, they became rational agents, acting according to their sense of public duty rather than listening to their instincts, impulses or desires. 26 The ideal republic was thus an association
of free and equal citizens, responding to a common will and working
for a common good.
But in the real world, Rousseau acknowledged, the republic was
vulnerable. Threatened by internal corruption and external conquest, it
depended for its survival on the virtue of its citizens. Following the lead
of his republican predecessors, Rousseau defined virtue as the propensity to place the public good above private interests: “Nothing,” he wrote
in the Social Contract, “is more dangerous than the influence of private
interests on public aﬀairs…,” because whenever they dominate, the
state is corrupted in its very essence.27 As the main source of corruption, Rousseau pointed to luxury, a condition all healthy republics
should avoid. Luxury divided citizens into social classes, thereby undermining the republic’s cohesion, and bred indolence, enticing citizens
to neglect their social responsibilities. As soon as they “serve with their
pocketbooks rather than with their persons,” Rousseau warned in true
republican fashion, “the State is already close to its ruin. Is it necessary
to march to battle? They pay troops and stay home. Is it necessary to
attend the Council? They name deputies and stay home. By dint of
laziness and money, they finally have soldiers to enslave the country and
representatives to sell it.”28
12
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Only virtuous citizens, then, had the ability to preserve the republic. They valued the public good above all else and participated directly
in civic life so as to secure it, attending the assembly and bearing arms
in the republic’s defense. Their manners and morals were simple; they
were immune to the enticements of luxury, seeking neither comfort nor
profit; they were forever vigilant, keeping watch on their governors and
neighbors. They were free, equal and independent: “no citizen shall be
so opulent that he can buy another,” Rousseau stipulated, “and none so
poor that he is constrained to sell himself.” 29 Here were unmistakeable
echoes of the republican ideal as found in the works of Machiavelli and
the other Florentines. Rousseau’s republic may have been small—and a
small republic was preferable because it was uniform, cohesive and easy
to administer—but no matter how small, it could defend itself by mustering the collective strength of its members, and since it had the coherence of a single person, it could direct this strength with a single will in
order to achieve a single aim.

3
Rousseau’s speculations were not all theoretical, and on at least two
occasions he turned his attention to practical matters. In 1764, Matteo
Buttafuoco, a Corsican soldier serving in the French army, invited
Rousseau, now famous for the Social Contract, to design a political system that would preserve Corsica’s freedom and independence. Several
years later, around 1771, a convention of patriotic Polish aristocrats
seeking their country’s independence from Russian interference, invited
Rousseau to frame the best constitution possible for Poland. Both invitations provided him with an opportunity to comment on real-world
situations. His Considerations on the Government of Poland in particular
addressed explicitly the problem of how the small republic should defend itself in a world of hostile states. At times Rousseau pointed to
13
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federalism as a possible solution: republics could keep their more powerful neighbors at bay by uniting in a federation as the Swiss had done
to protect themselves from Habsburg aggression. He recommended, for
example, that the Poles divide their country into numerous small republics and then unite them in a federation for defense.30 Unfortunately, we know little more than this. Rousseau either destroyed, lost, or
never wrote those sections of the Social Contract dealing with federalism. Alternatively, republics could establish defensive alliances with
more powerful neighbors. But Rousseau advised against this policy, noting that treaties rarely worked to the advantage of small states. “Alliances, treaties, the faith of men, all these can bind the weak to the
strong and never bind the strong to the weak,” he warned the Corsicans: “Thus leave negotiations to the powers and do not count on anything but yourself.”31
This last phrase—“do not count on anything but yourself ”—epitomized the republican ideal: instead of relying on others, the republic
should call on the virtue of its citizens. It should foster their patriotism,
encouraging them to put country before self, and organize them in a
people’s militia for defense. This was his explicit advice to the Poles, and
he pointed to the Social Contract for its theoretical justification. Poland
was in a precarious position, surrounded by powerful and aggressive
neighbors, all of whom had large armies at their command. Instead of
trying to match these armies, which would only bankrupt the state,
Poland should model itself on the Roman and Swiss republics and create a citizen’s militia: “This militia will cost the Republic little, will always be ready to serve it, and will serve it well, because in the end one
always defends one’s own possessions better than someone else’s.”32 In
true republican fashion, Rousseau pointed out that a people’s militia,
unlike a standing army, would pose no threat to liberty. 33 The militia’s
strength would reside in patriotism, in its “love of the fatherland and of
freedom…. As long as this love burns in hearts it will perhaps not pro14
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tect you against a temporary yoke; but sooner or later it will explode,
shake oﬀ the yoke and set you free. Work then without relaxation,
ceaselessly, to carry patriotism to the highest degree in all Polish
hearts.” 34 Rousseau finally indicated how to foster this patriotism
through proper education: “Upon opening its eyes a child ought to see
the fatherland and until death ought to see nothing but it. Every true
republican imbibes the love of the fatherland, that is to say, of the laws
and of freedom along with his mother’s milk. This love makes up his
whole existence; he sees only the fatherland, he lives only for it; as soon
as he is alone, he is nothing: as soon as he has no more fatherland, he
no longer is, and if he is not dead, he is worse than dead.” 35
Here we see the importance of patriotism for Rousseau’s thinking.
The virtuous citizen must be a patriot, and the need to cultivate this
patriotism placed certain conditions on the republic. In the first place,
it required homogeneity. The republic emerged from an act of association in which all citizens surrendered their individuality to the general
will. If the republic was a collective person with a single will, then there
could be no factions within it. There could be no self-governing associations within the republic, for that would divide the general will, would
divide sovereignty, and would deprive patriotism of its object. The republic must be uniform—on this he was adamant: “For the same reason that sovereignty is inalienable,” he wrote in the Social Contract, “it
is indivisible. Because either the will is general or it is not. It is the will
of the people as a body, or of only a part.” 36 For Rousseau, a divided
will meant a fragmented republic:
…when factions, partial associations at the expense of the large
one, are formed, the will of each of these associations becomes general with reference to its members and particular with reference to
the State…. When one of these associations is so big that it prevails
over all the others,… then there is no longer a general will…. In
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order for the general will to be well expressed, it is therefore important that there be no partial society in the State….37
Uniformity, then, was the precondition for patriotism: citizens must be
loyal to the republic, not to particular sections within it. The republic
required that all other loyalties be erased. Patriotism, like sovereignty,
could not be divided.
This need for homogeneity also explained in part Rousseau’s preference for small states. He objected to the regional divisions that inevitably developed in large republics and that detracted from their unity. Diﬀerent regions, he noted, each with their own environments and
customs, created diﬀerent kinds of people with diﬀerent characteristics.
“The same laws cannot be suited to such a variety of provinces, which
have diﬀerent morals, live in contrasting climates, and cannot tolerate
the same form of government.” Thus large states would require several
diﬀerent legal systems. But “diﬀerent laws only produce discord and
confusion among peoples who, living under the same leaders and in
continuous communication, move and get married in each other’s areas,
and, being subjected to other customs, never know whether their patrimony is really theirs.”38 No one, we might add, would feel patriotic
toward a patrimony that was not one’s own. Instead, it was small groups
of people, those who were “already bound by some union of origin,
interest or convention,” that provided the most suitable material for a
republic. 39
But most important, the people must be malleable, for Rousseau
knew that nations had to be made. When individuals joined the republic, they acquired the positive freedom to become part of the social
whole, to merge into that single corporate entity we call the nation. It
was the operation of the republic’s institutions and laws that carried out
this transformation. Education, Rousseau had advised the Poles, provided one way to shape a pliable citizenry into a nation, and the opera16
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tion of the laws provided another. The process of ascertaining the general will brought into focus the common interests that united the people and pushed to the margins those that did not. Finally, Rousseau
envisioned a civil religion animating the entire republic and generating
the highest form of patriotism. Each republic, he wrote in the Social
Contract, should have its own religion, with its own gods, dogmas and
rituals defined by law. This religion, “by making the fatherland the object of the Citizens’ adoration,… teaches them that to serve the State is
to serve the tutelary God. It is a kind of Theocracy in which there
ought to be no other pontiﬀ than the Prince, nor other priests than the
magistrates. Then to die for one’s country is to be martyred, to violate
the laws is to be impious….”40
This patriotism, as Rousseau conceived it, was distinct from nationalism. Whereas patriotism involved loyalty to the republic founded on
citizenship and participation in the general will, nationalism entailed
loyalty to a nation, often defined by a common language, ethnicity,
culture, history and so on. Whereas patriotism demanded loyalty to a
small republic, nationalism called for a large nation-state coterminous
with the entire nation. These distinctions are important, as neither the
concept of nationality nor the idea of a nation-state were prevalent at
the time Rousseau was writing. But Rousseau was clearly heading in
their direction: when he advised the Poles to organize their country as a
federation of small republics, he was adapting his political theory to the
emerging world of nationalism. For Rousseau, the general will expressed what was common to all members of the republic, it represented the will of the whole. To move from this notion of popular sovereignty to nationalism required only a small step. Once the nation was
equated with the people, the general will expressed the national will. It
followed that the nation must be as unified as the republic, without
sections or divided loyalties. It, too, must be a public person with a single will.
17
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4
If Rousseau brought western political thinking to the verge of the
nation-state, Fichte crossed the line. His Addresses to the German Nation
ranks as one of the classic texts of European nationalism. Much of
Fichte’s political thinking, by way of Rousseau, came out of the republican tradition and established a unique political language for discussing
the nation-state. Although Fichte largely abandoned the vocabulary of
civic humanism, overlaying it with notions of soil, race and language,
he retained enough of the earlier tradition for the republican contours
of his thought to remain visible. He envisioned the nation, much as
Rousseau had envisioned the republic, as a uniform body animated by a
single will in which private interests yielded to the common good. Also
like Rousseau, he recognized that the nation would be vulnerable because it was part of the international system, and that its best defense
would be to call on the patriotism of individual citizens. The reason for
drawing these parallels is not to reduce Fichte’s Addresses to a replica of
Rousseau’s Social Contract—the Addresses are far too original and complex for that—but rather to demonstrate the suitability of republican
discourse for articulating the aspirations of the emerging nation-state.
Johann Gottlieb Fichte delivered his fourteen Addresses to the German Nation in Berlin, between December 1807 and March 1808, as
Prussia suﬀered under Napoleonic occupation. The state system in the
early nineteenth century, just like its eighteenth-century predecessor,
was subject to aggression, and Napoleon was every bit as intent on conquest as Frederick the Great had been. Control of the German states
played a crucial role in Napoleon’s foreign policy. Revolutionary armies
had already extended French domination as far as the Rhine, and
Napoleon continued the process, defeating Prussia decisively in the battles of Jena and Auerstedt (October 1806). For Germans like Fichte,
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Prussia’s humiliation was palpable: Frederick William III had taken
flight to East Prussia as French armies entered Berlin and the Prussian
kingdom and its army were reduced to shadows of their former selves.41
Fichte, who had escaped eastward with the king, later returned to occupied Berlin in order to deliver what he knew would be a set of subversive lectures. His Addresses, then, can be read as a response to the
Napoleonic conquest. The question they posed and the answer they
gave both echoed Rousseau: how could the German people defend
themselves in a world of predatory empires? Fichte’s answer: they must
become a nation.
Germans at the time, especially younger intellectuals, were fascinated by Rousseau as a philosopher of alienation, and Fichte was no exception. His origins were modest: his father made a living by weaving and
farming. He owed his education to an act of upper-class charity, when a
passing nobleman noticed his talent and took charge of his schooling.
As a young tutor, with little chance of meaningful employment, Fichte
felt estranged from the bourgeois and aristocratic society of his patrons.
This sense of marginality, of being an outsider in Germany’s society of
orders, drew Fichte to Rousseau, especially to his indictment of the corruption blighting modern society. 42 When the French Revolution broke
out, Fichte became a supporter and published in its defense a Contribution toward Rectifying the Judgment of the Public on the French Revolution
(1793), a work that drew inspiration from Rousseau’s Social Contract.
Whereas German opponents of the Revolution had routinely vilified
Rousseau, Fichte set out to vindicate him, declaring that he had already
“awakened” the “human spirit” and suggesting that Kant’s philosophy
had completed the work that he had begun.43 From that moment on,
Rousseau’s Social Contract became a point of departure for much of
Fichte’s political thinking.

19

Rousseau and the Nation-State

The French Revolution set the groundwork for Fichte’s proposed
revitalization of the German nation. Before the Revolution, Germany
had been a congeries of some three hundred independent states, some
large, some small. Germany’s fatal weakness, Fichte told his audience,
lay in this political and moral fragmentation. Individualism and selfinterest, what he called “material self-seeking,” had characterized the old
order, as princes cared only about their own states, not the whole of
Germany, and as citizens turned their backs on their neighbors. But this
entire edifice had now collapsed before the French—“self-seeking” had
been “destroyed by its own complete development”—and on its ruins
Germans would create a new nation. The Revolution, in defeating the
old Germany, had in eﬀect cleared the ground for Germany’s recovery.44
Fichte aimed his Addresses at all Germans, despite their apparent divisions, and he declared in true republican fashion that they must not
look to outsiders for help, but must learn to help themselves. The
means he proposed for doing this entailed the “fashioning of an entirely
new self.” He wanted “to mold the Germans into a corporate body,
which shall be stimulated and animated in all its individual members by
a common interest.” 45 So, in response to the French invasion, Fichte
called on the German speaking peoples to come together as a single
nation through a process of incorporation that would subsume individual self-interest in the general will and give meaning to all its members
by directing their eﬀorts toward something larger than themselves. Here
was Rousseau’s idea of the social contract applied to the nation.
Fichte insisted on the same degree of uniformity for the nation as
Rousseau had demanded for the republic. A German essence, he said,
rooted in race and language, had endured despite the calamities befalling the German people and would provide the source of this uniformity. Germans were a Teutonic people, a “branch of the Teutonic
race.” They were distinct from other Teutons because they had remained in their ancestral “dwelling places,” and because they had “re20
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tained and developed the original language of the ancestral stock.”46
The role of language was absolutely crucial here, for it provided the instrument that created and sustained nations. “Men are formed by language,” Fichte said, “far more than language is formed by men.”47 Languages, according to Fichte, existed independently of the people who
spoke them, and the ideas they contained deep within their fabric made
their speakers the people they were. Ancestral languages, developing
continuously and without foreign accretions, had the power therefore
to perpetuate nations. An idea of German nationality—what Fichte
described as the “sum total of the sensuous and mental life of the nation”—had been “deposited” in the German language, transforming all
who spoke it into Germans and guaranteeing the uniformity that would
allow the nation to form a single corporate body with a single will.48
Much like Rousseau, Fichte emphasized the importance of education for refashioning the German self. The process of molding the
German people into a nation would require “a total change of the existing system of education.” Whereas the old system had been suitable for
an age of material self-seeking, the new system would transform this
self-seeking into an quest for the common good. It would teach its students that freedom did not consist in doing as they pleased, but rather
in pursuing the interests of the nation as a whole. Education, in other
words, would compel them to be free, now that freedom was properly
understood as conforming to the national will.49 Whereas Rousseau had
simply stated that citizens of the republic who refused to obey the general will would be “constrained to do so,” Fichte specified the means for
ensuring obedience: “The education proposed by me, therefore, is to be
a reliable and deliberate art for fashioning in man a stable and infallible
good will.”50
We can read Fichte’s Addresses as an expression of what Isaiah Berlin
has termed positive liberty: the freedom to live a meaningful life by de-
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veloping one’s best self according to the standards of the community to
which one belongs.51 Though he did not use the term, Fichte articulated the concept in his discussion of the need to educate the will. For
Fichte, doing as one pleased was not exercising freedom, but rather responding to earthly appetites. True freedom, on the contrary, meant
living according to one’s essence; and in the context of the Addresses,
this meant living as a German. So, when Fichte proposed his new system of education and called on the rising generation of Germans to
discipline their collective will, he was asking them to exercise their freedom in a positive sense by awakening their German essence.52 In the
process, they would give their lives meaning. Outside the national
community, they would remain isolated as individuals; but within it,
they would become one with the ever-flowing stream of national life. At
times, Fichte gave this thought a mystical rendering. The German nation, he said, existed eternally as a transcendent idea that became real as
each generation disciplined its will and directed it toward the common
good. This process of bringing the German nation to life was never ending, as each new generation picked up where the previous had left oﬀ,
and it provided access to the divine. For Fichte, nations were earthly
reflections of the divine order, they were a “totality of men” arising “out
of the divine” and embodying it in their “national character.” As Germans labored to create their nation, they exercised their freedom by
bringing the divine to bear on earth. 53
Fichte’s understanding of the nation as the embodiment of the divine order might appear far removed from the more worldly republican
traditions with which we began this essay. And yet, Fichte was convinced that the German nation would express itself politically in republican institutions. Germans would succeed, he predicted, where the
French revolutionaries had failed: they would create the perfect state.
Whereas the French were mired in the age of self-seeking, the Germans
would undergo Fichte’s rigorous system of education and readily em22
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brace republican institutions. “Only the nation which has first solved in
actual practice the problem of educating perfect men will then solve
also the problem of the perfect state,” he told his audience. 54 History
had demonstrated that republican institutions, though alien to the
French, were natural to the Germans, whose past abounded with republics. The imperial cities of the Hanseatic League had developed
“civic constitutions and organizations which, though but on a small
scale, were nonetheless of high excellence….” The German burghers
had been true republicans, exercising civic virtue, sacrificing self-interest
for the common weal. The Germans, Fichte concluded, were the only
modern European nation “that has shown in practice, by the example
of its burgher class for centuries, that it is capable of enduring a republican constitution.” 55 For Fichte, then, the nation and the republic were
opposite sides of the same coin. The nation became synonymous with
the republic, an association in which individuals put self-interest aside,
submerged themselves in the general will, and worked for the common
good.
Now that he had embraced republican institutions, Fichte faced the
same question as Rousseau: how was the republic to defend itself? For
Fichte, the international order was just as predatory as it had been for
Rousseau. It was an aggressive system in which Germany had historically served as the chief battleground and German unity had been the
chief victim. Just think of the Thirty Years War or the wars of Frederick
the Great, in which the European powers had used the German states as
pawns in their quests for supremacy.56 So, how was the German nation,
organized as a republic, to defeat its enemies? His answer: patriotism, or
what he called love of fatherland. “…He to whom a fatherland has been
handed down … fights to the last drop of his blood to hand on the precious possession unimpaired to his posterity. So it always has been.”
This was especially true when the fatherland was understood as an emanation of the divine order and its survival as the citizen’s best guarantee
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of eternity on earth. The ancient Romans, the original Teutons, and the
German Protestants at the Reformation had all fought for that sense of
eternity. 57 As before, Fichte’s language often crossed into the mystical,
but his conception of patriotism fell right into line with classical thinking. Like Machiavelli and Rousseau, he called on the republic’s citizens
to abandon their selfish impulses and provide for its defense. An armed
people would accomplish what no standing army had. Fichte may have
started his lectures with the observation that individual self-seeking had
allowed Napoleon to conquer, but he ended them with the prediction
that a love of fatherland, aroused by his new system of education,
would enable Germany finally to achieve its independence.58

5
This discussion of Fichte’s Addresses has demonstrated just how easily Rousseau’s republican discourse could be adapted to the new nationalism. Whereas Rousseau had conceptualized the republic, Fichte applied this conceptualization to the nation, an institution that would
shape so much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The parallels
between the two were quite profound. Both Rousseau and Fichte envisioned a political community based on an act of incorporation in which
private citizens merged their individual wills into a general will, creating
a single public person. This act of incorporation was preserved through
education, through shaping the individual will, through coercion even,
since neither Rousseau nor Fichte allowed deviance from the general
will. It ensured that the community achieved unity and pursued a
common goal. What individuals lost in terms of personal freedom—the
ability to do as they pleased—they gained in terms of moral sensibility.
Citizens, now partaking in the general will, became moral agents, leading meaningful lives, an integral part of their community. This insistence on uniformity played an even greater role when the republic or
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nation was contemplated not abstractly, but as part of the international
system, which both theorists recognized as predatory. Both Rousseau
and Fichte appreciated the republic’s precariousness, and drawing on a
long tradition of republican thinking, called on the patriotism of citizens—patriotism inculcated and strengthened through civic education—to defend the republic.
Right at the center of their thinking, however, lay a disturbing
paradox: Rousseau and Fichte both argued that individuals, in placing
themselves under the general will, suﬀered no loss of freedom. For
Rousseau, the citizen gave himself to no one when he gave himself to
everyone. For Fichte, the German did nothing more than renounce his
lower self when he submitted to the demands of the nation. This surrender of the individual will was crucial for both because it created the
unity that the republic or nation required if it were to survive as a
community capable of providing its members with purposeful lives.
And yet, it is not at all clear what they meant when they claimed that
the individual suﬀered no loss of freedom. This lack of clarity did not
escape contemporaries. Benjamin Constant, writing in 1810, just a few
years after Fichte delivered his Addresses, considered Rousseau’s theory a
rhetorical sleight of hand. 59 He was absolutely certain that it assigned
tremendous power to the agents who implemented the general will: “…
in handing yourself over to everyone else, it is certainly not true that
you are giving yourself to no one,” he wrote in his Principles of Politics.
“On the contrary, it is to surrender yourself to those who act in the
name of all. It follows that in handing yourself over entirely, you do not
enter a universally equal condition, since some people profit exclusively
from the sacrifice of the rest.” 60 If Rousseau conceived of the republic as
a public person, then Constant warned that this public person had the
power to oppress those who stood in its way; and as an illustration of
how this power could be abused, he demonstrated just how easy it
would be for such a government to persecute an unwanted minority.61
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Constant also questioned the relevance of Rousseau’s Social Contract to the emerging nineteenth century. Rather than speak to the
modern world, it appeared to share far more with the ancient Greek
and Roman republics, which were small, culturally uniform, and outfitted for war. “Our world is precisely the opposite of the ancient one,”
Constant observed in his Principles. “Everything in antiquity related to
war. Today everything is reckoned in terms of peace. In former times
each people was an isolated family, born hostile to other families. Now
a mass of people lives under diﬀerent names and diverse modes of social
organization….” 62 The state system whose beginnings Rousseau had
sketched in his Discourse on the Origins of Inequality resembled closely
the age of Frederick the Great, when princes went to war to conquer
territory and defend their reputations. Within this context, a warlike
republic that was compact, uniform, and animated by a single will
might have made sense. But if applied to the new nationalism—and we
have just followed its traces through Fichte’s Addresses to the German
Nation—then it might easily have conduced to politics that were belligerent, exclusive, and authoritarian.
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